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Abstract
This paper provides a brief description of the model of participatory justice that 
is emerging in Europe and in North and South American States. Participatory justice 
promotes new forms of conflict resolution, as does mediation, based on voluntariness 
and confidentiality, as well as the participation of all parties in the management of con-
flict. In 2010, Italian legislators introduced mediation as an alternative form of dispute 
resolution in civil and commercial matters in order to reduce the burden of the Courts. 
This reform has not been successful so far because Italian lawmakers have introduced 
mediation into the civil justice system without reforming the framework of its under-
lying principles.
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Resumen
El presente artículo tiene como propósito realizar una breve descripción teórica so-
bre el modelo de justicia participativa que está surgiendo en Europa y en los Estados 
del continente americano. La justicia participativa promueve métodos alternativos de 
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resolución de conflictos, como la mediación, caracterizados por la voluntariedad, la 
confidencialidad y la participación de todas las partes en la gestión de conflictos que las 
dividen. En 2010 los legisladores italianos introdujeron la mediación en asuntos civiles 
y mercantiles para reducir la carga de los tribunales. La reforma, sin embargo, no tuvo 
éxito debido a que los legisladores italianos establecieron la mediación sin armonizar 
sus principios con los del modelo tradicional de justicia. 
Palabras clave
Justicia participativa, mediación, acceso a la justicia, métodos alternativos de reso-
lución de conflictos.
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Paradigms of justice: from decision to participation 
All States observing the rule of the law are experiencing a crisis in their administra-
tion of justice to varying degrees. The lowest common denominator in this phenom-
enon is the discrepancy between social expectations and the judicial system the State 
offers. Both European and American citizens have expressed increasing disaffection 
towards judicial systems. They view as marred by slowness, burdensome costs, and in-
adequacy in protecting their rights and interests. It has become clear that the problem 
is not merely a matter of organizational efficiency, although in some cases –such as in 
Italy– dysfunctions in the system play a major role in the breadth of the crisis1. The roots 
of the crisis have to do with the modern judicial system itself: it has lost its explanatory 
strength and it no longer adequately responds to the waves of radical change contempo-
rary society is experiencing. This crisis in the modern legal universe is clearly evidenced 
by challenges to a political order centered around the State and a legal order based upon 
state law as an imperative and unilateral command. Jurists do not appear to have yet 
perceived the radical nature of these signs2. 
In order to explain the complex dynamics at play, Ost makes reference to Kuhn’s 
famous theory according to which the evolution of scientific progress does not occur 
in a progressive or gradual manner, but rather via abrupt changes that sweep away a 
paradigm and replace it with another that is considered more apt to adequately explain 
and regulate reality3. A paradigm expresses a framework of theories and principles that 
form the backbone of the scientific community’s consensus with regard to an explicative 
model of reality that provides researchers with solutions to emerging problems4. When-
ever a paradigm is no longer capable of “containing” and explaining certain phenomena 
or resolving the problems these create, it experiences a crisis and is eventually replaced 
by a newer and more adequate alternative. According to Ost, a shift in the dominant 
legal paradigm is currently underway; a hierarchical, State-centered, positivist model 
is being challenged by a competing paradigm represented by the concept of “network”, 
which currently coexists with the prevalent framework5. In the emerging legal model:
1. V. Ferrari, “La giustizia come servizio. Centralità della giurisdizione e forme alternative di tutela”, in Studi di diritto pro-
cessuale in onore di Giuseppe Tarzia, Tomo I, Giuffré, Milano, 2005, pp. 47- 66. 
2. F. Ost, “Dalla piramide alla rete: un nuovo paradigma per la scienza giuridica?”, in Il tramonto della modernità giuridica, 
M. Vogliotti (Ed.), Giappichelli, Torino, 2008, pp. 29-48, p. 30.
3. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970 2nd edition.
4. Ibid., p. 43.
5. F. Ost discusses the improper use of the theory in the humanities; however, he argues for its efficacy as it relates to the 
contemporary legal model, whose characteristics are universally recognized, F. Ost, “Dalla piramide alla rete: un nuovo 
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The State is no longer the sole source of sovereignty; the will of legislators is no 
longer accepted as dogma; the lines between facts and rights are blurred; powers 
interact; judicial systems become muddled; knowledge of jurisprudence moves 
from methodological purity to interdisciplinary thinking; finally, the pyramidal 
concept of justice of yesteryear anchored by axiological hierarchies established by 
law is now viewed more in terms of balancing interests and values that are both 
varied and changeable6. 
Moving away from the authoritarian nature that has characterized the modern age, 
the law becomes more participatory in nature both in its lawmaking processes and in 
how it handles conflict resolution7. While the dominant paradigm of justice is based on 
the State’s monopoly and upon judicial decision-making as a preferred conflict resolu-
tion tool, the emerging one is characterized by plurality in the legal order and use of 
consensual and alternative approaches. 
In this section, we will attempt to map out some of the emerging justice model’s 
characteristics and outline how they purport to more adequately respond to civil society 
that demands a “proximity justice”8 that is more flexible, swift and fair. To this end, we 
will briefly outline the access to justice movement and the rise in alternative conflict 
resolution tools, which have both reached transnational proportions and caught the 
attention of mainstream political and governmental institutions.
The response to these consensual dispute resolution trends by different legal systems 
has shed interesting light upon the crisis that heralds a paradigm shift. In the Italian sys-
tem, these alternative methods, particularly mediation, have been viewed as “anomalies” 
to be pigeonholed into conceptual categories belonging to the dominant judicial model 
rather than as an expression of a new consensual, participatory model of justice within 
an emerging new paradigm.
paradigma per la scienza giuridica?”, p. 32.
6. Ibid.
7. Cfr. A. J. Arnaud, “Le sfide della globalizzazione alla modernità giuridica”, in Il tramonto della modernità giuridica, M. 
Vogliotti (ed.), pp. 77-94, (p. 79).
8. A. Wyvekens, “Justice de proximité et proximité de la justice. Les maisons de justice et du droit”, in Droit et Société, 1996, 
33, pp. 1-23; J. L. Bilon, “La proximité de la justice, approche française”, in Revue de Prévention et réglementation des Diffé-
rends, 4-3, 2006, pp. 33-46.
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Access to justice and rights
“Access to justice” can be understood as a theoretical and reform-driving movement 
that, beginning with the second half of the last century, has made its way across the 
Western world and been associated with reclaiming and protecting civil rights. Instead 
of focusing on the nature and content of said rights, the movement has concentrated 
on procedural and judicial mechanisms as essential conditions for exercising the rights 
themselves9. Over the last fifty years, the various economic, societal and organizational 
obstacles to the protection of rights that engender social inequality have become the 
subject of research, analyses and reforms mainly focused upon procedural and juris-
diction-related aspects of the law in various nations. According to Mauro Cappelletti, 
one of the eminent scholars in the field, the “access to justice” movement is the greatest 
answer to the crisis of justice in the contemporary age because it is tantamount to a 
“Copernican revolution” in our way of conceptualizing the Law. In fact, there has been 
a shift from the traditional “Tolemaic” view wherein justice is seen from the viewpoint 
of those who produce or “manufacture” the law and focuses on their “product” (i.e., 
lawmakers and the law; public administrations and decrees, judges and sentences). The 
new paradigm turns attention towards the recipients of justice, “consumers of rights 
and law” –namely individuals, groups of citizens and society itself as a whole10. 
The many meanings that “Access to justice” expresses can be placed into two broad 
thematic categories: the first pertains to a set of legal theories; the second concerns 
the reforms that, albeit to different degrees, have affected most Western nations and 
brought about a series of relevant changes in the judicial process. 
A characteristic shared by the legal theories is a shift away from a dogmatic concep-
tualization of law –one of the main features of formalist legal positivism– along with 
some features of American legal realism, which determines the validity of law on the 
basis of its effectiveness rather than its formal validity. However, while legal realism 
theories explore the institutional domains of jurisprudence by investigating the role of 
the judge as a lawmaker11, they also broaden their approach to a social analysis of law 
by taking into account the wide network of individuals, institutions and proceedings 
through which it develops, takes hold, and exerts its influence.
9. M. Cappelletti, Accesso alla giustizia, in Enciclopedia delle scienze sociali, Treccani, 1988, retieved from http://www.trecca-
ni.it/enciclopedia/accesso-alla-giustizia_(Enciclopedia_delle_scienze_sociali)/
10. M. Cappelletti, Dimensioni della giustizia nelle società contemporanee, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1994, p. 100.
11. See G. Tarello, Il realismo giuridico americano, Giuffré, Milano, 1962. 
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Access to justice theorists make the case for a “contextual” conception of law and 
view its efficacy in terms of three parameters: the social needs the law intends to respond 
to, the identified legal solution to problems, and the social outcomes achieved12.
This brings us to the second broad theme of access to justice: reform. The driving 
force behind this is the aim of abating economically driven social inequality (which re-
duces marginalized populations’ access to justice), organizational issues (which hamper 
the protection of collective interest) and procedural problems (which render traditional 
judicial means inadequate in fully protecting rights). 
The Florence Project on Access to Justice
The movement was conclusively defined and “consecrated” by a study coordinated 
by Mauro Cappelletti, entitled Florence Project on Access to Justice, published in 1978 and 
universally considered the broadest investigation of access to justice to date13. In addition 
to providing an impressive amount of empirical data regarding justice systems across the 
world, this study demarcated the theoretical underpinning of the movement through in-
terdisciplinary methods and comparative analysis14. 
In the general introduction, Cappelletti and Garth argue that “access to justice” is 
a useful lens through which we can evaluate the health of contemporary democracies. 
The expression “access to justice” refers to the two main goals of a judicial system un-
derstood as a means for people to defend their rights and resolve conflict in a state-sanc-
tioned manner: first, the system must be equally accessible to all; second, it must aim 
for results that are both individually and socially just. Although the authors point out 
that research focuses on the first objective, they highlight that the two are intertwined: 
a system that aspires to social justice, as modern democracy demands, must provide all 
its citizens with equal chances to lay claim to and protect their rights15. 
After noting that the rules and tools of a judicial process serve a social function and 
that a trial ought not to be viewed in terms of form and structure but rather also as 
a socially relevant practice16, the authors discuss three “waves” in the access to justice 
movement in chronological order.
12. M. Cappelletti, Dimensioni della giustizia, p. 77.
13. M. Cappelletti (ed.), Access to Justice, Giuffré – Sijthoff, Milano – Alphen aan der Rijn, 1978.
14. V. Denti, “Accesso alla giustizia e Welfare State (a proposito del Florence Access to Justice Project)”, in Rivista Trimestrale 
di Diritto e Procedura Civile, 1982, pp. 618-626.
15. M. Cappelletti, B. Garth, “Access to Justice: the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective. A General Report”, in 
M. Cappelletti (ed.), Access to Justice. A World Survey, vol. I, book 1, p. 6.
16. V. Denti, “Sistematica e post-sistematica nella evoluzione delle dottrine del processo”, in Rivista critica di diritto privato, 
IV, 1, 1986, pp. 469-492.
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The first occurred after World War II until the late 1970s and mainly focused on the 
issue of providing legal assistance to economically disenfranchised citizens.
Beginning in the early 1970s, a second wave of reforms followed, this time honing 
in on issues of collective interest; this change in traditional civil proceedings entailed a 
revolutionary shift from protection of individual rights towards collective action and 
the recognition of groups and sectors of society as holders of rights. Class action pro-
ceedings are a prime example of this. 
Finally, the third wave occurred after the late 1970s and was characterized by an “ac-
cess-to-justice-approach” focused upon both judicial and extra-judicial institutions and 
tools used for conflict resolution in public and private arenas17. 
In this third phase, attention shifted from the trial to the conflict and from the 
barriers preventing access to the Courts to the limitations of the judicial process 
itself insofar as it is inadequate in satisfying the interests of all involved parties in 
a dispute. 
Basing their argument on Frank Sander’s belief that conflict resolution tools must 
be tailored to different types of disputes18, Cappelletti and Garth made a case for 
alternate tools like arbitration, mediation and conciliation as means of improving 
access to justice. While the first two waves of the movement still held on to an im-
plicitly normative and judicial orientation as evidenced by chosen legal assistance 
tools and the nature of the proposed reforms geared towards protection of collec-
tive rights, the third wave expressed a new legal perspective that contemplates novel 
conflict resolution tools as an alternative to the traditional trial. This new concept of 
justice is termed “coexistent” by Cappelletti: “It can bring divergent positions closer 
to one another, lead to solutions in which there is not necessary a winner and loser 
but rather mutual understanding and bilateral behavioral change”19. Going back to 
Ost’s hypothesis, it is precisely in this third wave that the “anomaly” of extra-judicial 
tools comes to the forefront in ways the dominant legal model is unable to explain or 
conceptually integrate. 
17. M. Cappelletti, B. Garth, “Access to Justice: the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective. A General Report”, p. 49.
18. M. Cappelletti, B. Garth, This approach recognizes the need to relate and adapt the civil process to the type of dispute, p. 52. 
See also F. E. Sander, “Varieties of Dispute Processing”, in A. L. Levin and R. R. Wheeler, The Pound Conference: Perspectives 
on Justice in the Future. Proceedings of the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minnesota, 1979, pp. 65-87.
19. M. Cappelletti, Dimensioni della giustizia, p. 91.
G. Maria Antonietta Foddai  PARTICIPATORY JUSTICE AND MEDIATION
134
Soft Power          Volumen 4, número 2, julio-diciembre, 2016
Alternative Dispute Resolutions Methods: a Transnational Model 
While the access to justice project was developing at the University of Florence, a 
great justice reform movement was rising in the United States. Its aims and programs 
were discussed and illustrated in 1976 during the Pound Conference on “The Causes 
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice”20. It was at this event 
that Frank Sander, a law professor at Harvard University, proposed a way of improving 
the justice system that deeply impacted later reforms in the American judicial process. 
Sanders argued that each dispute is different and each resolution approach ought to 
be as well; the trial is not always necessarily the best option. Therefore, he proposed 
that the workload of the Courts could be lightened by using alternatives to the tradi-
tional trial, such as mediation and arbitration21. The expression “Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Method” was coined in reference to a justice process that served as an 
alternative to the mainstream judicial system capable of reaching satisfactory, swift and 
inexpensive dispute resolution22. Over time, the “A” in Alternative also came to stand for 
Appropriate23 in order to indicate an integrated and complementary conflict resolution 
method as opposed to a bipolar one based on the opposition between the State’s judicial 
process and private or informal mechanisms24.
Over the forty years that followed the Pound Conference, the expression “Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution” has been used to define a set of dispute resolution methods25 
and to indicate a model of justice that is more flexible than traditionally rigid court 
proceedings, more in line with the people’s needs. It has come to represent a world-
wide movement that, to varying degrees, has affected America, Europe, Australia and 
Asia26. In fact, ADR refers to a series of practices and methods that need little to no 
20. A. L. Levin, R. R. Wheeler, The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future.
21. F. E. Sander, “A second way of reducing the judicial caseload is to explore alternative ways of resolving disputes outside 
the courts, and it is to this topic that I wish to devote my primary attention”, Varieties of Dispute Processing, p. 66.
22. S. Roberts, M. Palmer, Dispute Processes, ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005, p. 46. 
23. C. Menkel-Meadow, “Mediation, Arbitration, and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)”, in International Encyclopedia 
of the Social § Behavioral Sciences, edited by N. J. Smelser, P. B. Baltes, Elsevier Science Ltd., Oxford, 2001, pp. 9507-9512. 
“The term ‘appropriate’ dispute resolution is used to express the idea that different kinds of disputes require different kinds 
of processes” (p. 9507).
24. See. P. Adler, “The Future of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Reflection on ADR as a Social Movement”, S. Engle Merry e 
N. Milner (Eds.), The Possibility of Popular Justice, A Case Study of Community Mediation in the Unites States, The University 
of Michigan Press, USA, 1993, p. 68.
25. A. J. Arnaud, J. P. Bonafé Schmitt, “Alternative (Droit) – Alternative (Justice)”, in Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie 
et de sociologie du droit, 2a ed., LGDJ, Paris, 1993, pp. 13-15.
26. R. Abel (Ed.), The Politics of Informal Justice, vol. I, Academic Press, New York, 1982; J. S. Auerbach, Justice Without Law?, 
Oxford University Press, New York – Oxford, 1983. N. Alexander (ed.), Global Trends in Mediation (second ed.), Kluwer 
Law International, Alphen aan der Rijn (The Netherland), 2006.
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adaptation to the local national judicial system27. In this sense, it is a transnational 
model that goes beyond the confines of State sovereignty and moves into a global ju-
dicial space supported by globalization and propelled by new challenges to those pol-
icies still based upon said State sovereignty28. A comparative analysis highlights aims 
and factors that can bring common and civil law closer together in a shared effort to 
reform the justice system29. However, Alexander warns that because social practices 
must be understood in the context of specific cultures, beliefs and institutions, they 
play out differently in diverse justice systems. Therefore, along with the principle of 
universality we must also consider our differences, which heed a warning against ap-
plying mediation practices in a homogenous, inflexible way across socio-geographical 
contexts30. 
Legal Mediation
ADR includes a wide range of practices that even experts sometimes have trouble 
grouping under a common umbrella: they range from heteronomous ones like arbi-
tration (wherein a third party chosen by the disputing subjects makes a decision based 
upon the law) to autonomous ones31 such as conciliation and mediation, wherein an 
impartial third party helps the disputing sides come to a resolution of common accord. 
Mediation is one of the chief expressions of ADR, not only because it affords flexibility 
in its practice and is quite adaptable to diverse contexts and legal orders, but also be-
cause of the model of social justice and order it exemplifies32.
Mediation can be defined as:
A process in which the parties and their lawyers meet with a neutral mediator 
whose job is to assist them in finding a resolution to the dispute at hand. The me-
diator facilitates effective communication and helps each party express its point 
27. The European Union also welcomed the ADR acronym. In the European Commission’s Green Book on civil and 
commercial dispute resolution methods, published on April 19th, 2002, the Commission states : “The alternative methods 
of dispute resolution will therefore be referred to below by the acronym that is tending to be accepted universally in prac-
tice, i.e. ‘ADR’”, COM (2002) Def., available from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/?uri=celex:52002DC0196 
(viewed on June 25th, 2016).
28. See M. Cappelletti, Dimensioni della giustizia, p. 12; M. R. Ferrarese, “Il linguaggio transnazionale dei diritti”, in Rivista 
di diritto costituzionale, 5, 2000, pp. 74-108 (p. 74).
29. V. Varano, (ed.), L’altra giustizia: i metodi alternativi di soluzione delle controversie nel diritto comparato, Giuffré, Milano, 
2007. 
30. N. Alexander, Global Trends in Mediation, p. 3.
31. See P. Luiso, “La conciliazione nel quadro della tutela dei diritti”, in Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, 58, 4, 
2005, pp. 1201-1220.
32. For a broad analysis of ADR methods see M. Cicogna, G. di Rago, G. N. Giudice, La conciliazione commerciale, Santar-
cangelo di Romagna, Maggioli, 2005, pp. 40 ss. 
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of view and understand the other’s, identifies strengths and weaknesses of both 
positions, thus coming to a potential solution everyone can agree upon33.
While many researchers have championed its legal soundness34 and praised its social 
impact35, many have viewed the advent of non-judicial conflict resolution methods with 
great skepticism and wariness. This has been the case both in the United States, where 
the phenomenon began to take hold as far back as the 1970s, and in various European 
nations, Italy included. Some sociologists have interpreted ADR methods as a means 
of engendering a new political balance outside of constitutional safeguards36 and some 
jurists have gone as far as branding them as violations of the principles of law37. 
These methods have been viewed more as alternatives to justice than to the trial: 
“foreign bodies” inserted into the legal order for the mere purpose of unburdening 
the courts38. Counterarguments to such criticism have focused on efficiency, availability 
and social satisfaction associated with these alternative practices, but have nonetheless, 
failed to fully defend “cooperative” approaches as legally rightful practices supported by 
the principles of the legal system. 
The justice landscape therefore seems to present a disjointed ensemble of methods 
with contrasting elements: on one hand the formal judicial process based on princi-
ples of legality; on the other, informal consensual methods that sacrifice the safeguards 
afforded by a traditional trial in favor of a “satisfactory” conciliation of both parties’ 
interests. 
A recent report produced by the Canadian government provides an interesting view 
of the phenomenon as an integrated model of justice wherein the opposition between 
judicial and extra-judicial methods is reinterpreted in light of legal pluralism and the 
principle of participation. In a sense, it approaches the issue of justice from the “Coper-
nican” perspective championed by Cappelletti thirty years ago in the Florence project39. 
33. O. Chase, Gestire i conflitti. Diritto, cultura rituali, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2005, p. 116. 
34. L. Fuller, “Mediation: Its Forms and Functions”, in Southern California Law Review, 44, 1971, pp. 305-339; L. Fuller, K. 
Winston, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”, in Harvard Law Review, 92, 2, 1978, pp. 353-409; F. P. Luiso, “La concil-
iazione nel quadro della tutela dei diritti”; R. Abel (ed.), The Politics of Informal Justice, vol. I.
35. R. Abel (ed.), The Politics of Informal Justice, vol. I; J. P. Bonafé-Schmitt, La médiation. Une justice douce, Syros Alter-
natives, Paris, 1992; J. Faget, “Éloge du fluide. Une lecture socio-politique de la médiation”, in La quête anthropologique du 
droit, sous la direction de C. Eberhard - G. Vernicos, Éditions Karthala, Paris, 2006, pp. 351-368.
36. L. Nader, “The A.D.R. Explosion – The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal Reform”, in Windsor Yearbook of Access to 
Justice, 8, 1988, pp. 269-291.
37. O. M. Fiss, “Against Settlement”, in The Yale Law Journal, 93, 6, 1984, pp. 1073-1090.
38. See observations by V. Ferrari, La giustizia come servizio, p. 47; also see P. H. Lindblom, “La risoluzione alternativa delle 
controversie. L’oppio del sistema giuridico?”, in L’altra giustizia, V. Varano, (ed.), pp. 219-253.
39. See above, p. 2.
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“Transforming Relationships through Participatory Justice”: a 
Canadian Proposal 
Beginning in the 1990s, the Canadian government sponsored a series of initiatives 
centered around the issue of access to justice aimed at redefining the problem and de-
veloping participative justice policies. Some particularly noteworthy reports were pre-
pared in response to federal and provincial interest; they outlined the evolution of the 
access to justice movement over the course of three decades and highlighted both the 
inevitable need for change within the legal system and the dynamic nature of Canadian 
society and its institutions40. 
It is therefore not happenstance that a report on participative justice published in 
2003 no longer made reference to “access to justice” but rather focused on the idea 
of participation; in this conceptualization, justice no longer requires someone to open 
or shut doors to its availability but rather calls for citizens to participate in its “con-
struction”. Transforming Relationships through Participatory Justice was published by the 
Law Commission of Canada in 2003 in response to a 2000 request by the Government, 
which tasked it with researching the justice system in the Federation and assessing the 
degree of popular satisfaction with regard to its conflict resolution functions41. The 
Commission’s Report expressed a view of the law as an emancipatory practice open 
to the initiatives brought forth by citizens and communities and it redefined the phys-
ical “places” of justice as no longer limited to the courtroom and State institutions but 
rather as inclusive of social and community-based contexts. In addition to framing the 
issues at hand within the complex needs of a multicultural society like modern-day 
Canada, the report highlights a series of both judicial and extra-judicial tools aimed at 
protecting the rights and developing a socially responsible network. The traditional trial 
is no longer on the main stage and is pushed aside by the need for a plurality of consen-
sual dispute resolution methods based upon voluntary participation, informal practices 
and confidentiality understood within a framework of legal safeguards. 
The central idea the Commission starts from is the concept of conflict in all its ex-
pressions in interpersonal relationships, be it within the family, workplace, neighbor-
hood, community or other context requiring negotiation42. On one hand, conflict is 
40. R. A. Macdonald (ed.), Jalons pour une plus grande accessibilité à la justice: rapport du Groupe de travail sur l’accessibilité 
à la justice, Ministère de la Justice, Québec, 1991.
41. Law Commission of Canada, Transforming Relationships Through Participatory Justice, Ottawa (Ontario), 2003, Par-
ticipatory Justice, Ottawa (Ontario), 2003, available from http://publications.gc.ca/site/archivee-archived.html?url=http://
publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/JL2-22-2003F.pdf (viewed on June 25th, 2016).
42. Ibid., pp. 1-3.
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viewed with concern because of its potential to do damage to property, people and 
relationships; on the other hand, it is a natural feature of any living system which can 
foster growth and help groups adapt to systemic changes within familial, social or po-
litical contexts43. It is its degeneration into unhealthy behavior that can lead to destruc-
tive and sometimes irreversible consequences. Using the concept of conflict rather than 
dispute as a springboard for analysis allows one to view the issues from the perspective 
of the people who experience it first-hand rather than from a strictly procedural or 
institutional standpoint. The report deems the traditional justice system inadequate in 
responding to the people’s expectations and needs, and it points out that: “Conflicts are 
framed in legal language, rather than in terms of how individual experience them”44. 
The legal translation of “conflict” into “dispute” mutilates the former by ignoring 
all those social aspects that are not taken into consideration in a courtroom but are 
nonetheless part of the social expectations of justice45.
The Commission also revisits the distinction between penal and civil law and its 
respective procedural rules in light of the concept of social manifestation of conflict. In 
fact, the report argues that current reflections on justice are limited by the consolidated 
distinction between civil and penal conflict46. The report associates these arenas with 
two forms of justice: reparative justice and consensus-based justice47. The former “refers 
to the resolution of a crime or conflict characterized by focus on the harm done to the 
victims, encourages perpetrators to take responsibility for their actions, and calls for 
community participation”; the second involves a range of cooperative conflict resolu-
tion methods whose chief feature is allowing the involved parties to have control over 
how the dispute is resolved48.
Reparative and consensus-based justice share common values: participation in the 
conflict management process; respect towards all parties; equal treatment in the case of 
consensus-based justice and strengthening of a community’s autonomy in reparative jus-
tice; commitment to agreed-upon solutions; flexibility and adaptability of the process.
The Commission’s intent is quite clear: 
43. Cfr. E. Arielli, G. Scotto, Conflitti e mediazione: introduzione a una teoria generale, Bruno Mondadori, Milano, 2003; S. 
Castelli, La mediazione. Teorie e tecniche, Raffaello Cortina, Milano, 1996, p. 22.
44. Law Commission of Canada, Transforming Relationships through Participatory Justice, p. 1.
45. V. Ferrari, Funzioni del diritto, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1997, p. 153; W. L. F. Felstiner., R. L. Abel, A. Sarat, “The Emergence 
and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming…”, in Law and Society Review, (15), 3-4, 1980/1981, pp. 
631-654.
46. L. Lalonde, “Le modes de PRD: vers une nouvelle conception de la justice?”, in Revue de prévention et de règlement des 
différends, (1), 2, 2003, pp. 17-43, (p. 35). 
47. Law Commission of Canada, Transforming Relationships through Participatory Justice, p. 5; 130.
48. Ibid., p. 3.
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Both restorative justice and consensus-based justice attempt to capitalize on the 
transformative potential of conflict, to use conflict as a springboard for moving 
toward a more just society. Participation is the key to the transformation process. 
Parties in conflict ought to be actively involved in finding resolutions to it. In this 
report, therefore, we refer generically to restorative justice and consensus-base 
justice as participatory processes49.
This attempt at integrating the two forms of justice by encompassing them in a co-
hesive framework of values seems quite original compared to the strictly separate and 
distinct view of them held by Italian theorists. Beginning in the 1990s, in Italy there was 
also a surge of research and projects centred around reparative and consensus-based 
justice. Universities, the Ministry of Justice and numerous private associations devel-
oped penal mediation programs50. Over the last two decades, the field of civil mediation 
has also grown remarkably, especially in terms of research and pilot programs mostly 
carried forth by Chambers of Commerce, which have played a major role in promoting 
and popularizing extra-judicial conciliatory activities51. 
However, to date, there has been no cohesive reflection that views the reparative 
and negotiation-based models through the same lens in terms of issues and inspiring 
principles. In this sense, these two spheres have never ‘spoken’ to one another; in Italy, 
but have rather continued to live in the shadow of the status quo dictated by traditional 
penal and civil justice.
Mediation in the Italian Legal System
Although Cappelletti paved the way to research on access to justice and participa-
tory methods, Italy was one of the last countries in Europe to regulate mediation52. 
49. Ibid., p. 5
50. See. L. Eusebi, La funzione della pena: il commiato da Kant e da Hegel, Giuffré, Milano, 1989; M. Bouchard, “La mediazio-
ne: una terza via per la giustizia penale?”, in Questione giustizia, 3-4, 1992, pp. 757 ss.; F. Scaparro (ed.) Il coraggio di mediare, 
Guerini e associati, Milano, 2001; C. Mazzucato, “Mediazione e giustizia riparativa in ambito penale”, in G. Cosi, M. A. 
Foddai (eds.) Lo spazio della mediazione, Giuffré, Milano 2003; G. Mannozzi, La giustizia senza spada, Giuffré, Milano 2003.
51. See F. Cuomo Ulloa, La nuova mediazione, Zanichelli, Bologna, 2013; L. Cominelli, “La risoluzione delle dispute”, Fran-
coAngeli, Milano, 2012; F. Danovi, F. Ferraris, La cultura della mediazione e la mediazione come cultura, Giuffré, Milano, 
2013.
52. Starting in the 1990s, the European Union has undertaken initiatives and policies aimed at finding new tools for conflict 
resolution. In the 2002 Green Book on alternative conflict resolution tools referenced above, the EU outlines how member 
states have adopted alternatives to judicial approaches as a political priority aimed at improving access to justice for Euro-
pean citizens and favoring the development of social and commercial relationships across the Union. Directive 2008/52 of 
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With the implementation of Law 69/2009, Italian legislators began a process of re-
form of civil justice in an effort to address the “perennial” crisis of the Italian system 
and the people’s complaints about an institution they perceived as slow, costly, unfair 
and unable to meet social expectations53. On one hand, the aims of this reform in-
volved “internal” simplification through the streamlining and reducing of the dura-
tion of proceedings (sec. 54), and on the other, “external simplification” by moving 
a considerable number of disputes towards mediation-based resolutions (sec. 60)54. 
Its guidelines reflect a policy aimed at conserving the traditional judicial model of 
dispute-resolution whilst simplifying and improving it via the introduction of some 
corrective measures. Indeed, legislators explicitly tasked mediation with relieving 
some of the burden from the Courts55. It was not until 2010 that mediation officially 
appeared in the Italian legal system. This was also a response to Directive 2008/52/
EU, which obliged Member States to adopt mediation in cross-border disputes and 
encouraged them to also utilize it in internal disputes.
Legislative Decree 28/2010, modified in 2013, applies to disputes in civil and com-
mercial matters and foresees four types of mediation: the first is optional and freely 
chosen by the parties; the second derives from a contractual clause that obliges parties 
to turn to mediation to settle disputes in contract implementation; the third is delegat-
ed by a judge who can request that the parties have recourse to a mediation center; the 
last is compulsory, and requires parties to turn to mediation before any lawsuit is filed 
regarding certain matters (e.g. medical liability, inheritance)56. 
Mandatory mediation has been subject to harsh criticism both from the legal 
community and from mediators themselves57. In particular, while mediators have 
condemned the violation of the principle of voluntariness that is the keystone of me-
diation, lawyers have denounced the violation of one’s constitutional right to legal 
action arising from this additional, compulsory phase that, in their opinion, increases 
May 21st, “on certain aspects of mediation in commercial and civil spheres”, is the result of a process set in motion with the 
Green Book. With this measure, the Union required member states to regulate transnational disputes through mediation 
and encouraged them to utilize mediation for internal disputes as well. 
53. V. Ferrari, “La giustizia come servizio. Centralità della giurisdizione e forme alternative di tutela”, in Studi di diritto 
processuale in onore di Giuseppe Tarzia, vol. I, Giuffrè, Milano, 2005, p. 47.
54. F. Cuomo Ulloa, La mediazione nel processo civile riformato, Zanichelli, Bologna, 2011. 
55. See. G. Scarselli, “Sugli errori degli ultimi venti anni nel porre rimedio alla crisi della giustizia civile”, in Il foro italiano 
I, 2010, pp. 50-54.
56. Art. 5, I co., d. lgs. 28/2010. See R. Caponi, “La giustizia civile alla prova della mediazione (a proposito del d. leg. 4 marzo 
2010 n. 28”, in Il foro italiano, II, 2010, vol. CXXXV, pp. 89-95; F. Cuomo Ulloa, La nuova mediazione, pp. 113 ss.
57. V. Ferrari called this reform “baffling” and stated it was characterized by “coarseness and improvisation”, “L’amministra-
zione della giustizia”, p. 181; F. Sitzia, “Alcune riflessioni problematiche sul d. lgs 4 marzo 2010 n. 28 e ordini professionali”, 
in Quaderni di conciliazione, 1, 2010, pp. 111-127. 
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expenses and makes access to justice more difficult58. Such critical attitudes, coupled 
with poor knowledge of the practice, have translated into scarce confidence in the 
institution of mediation. This is evidenced by data published by the Department of 
Justice in 201159 that highlights mediation’s highly problematic start in Italy. Accord-
ing to Taruffo:
The message legislators send to the citizen sounds something like this: since I am 
incapable of actually guaranteeing your rights will be safeguarded before a judge, 
I suggest (or demand) that you turn to mediation where perhaps you will be able 
to obtain something. This something will probably be less than what you might 
obtain from a judge, but it will still be better than nothing!60
Most lawyers and scholars therefore welcomed the Constitutional Court’s December 
6th, 2012 decision n. 272, which declared unconstitutional the first paragraph of art. 5 
of decree nr. 28/2010, which regulated mandatory mediation as a condition of admissi-
bility of claims in broad ranges of situations61. 
Legislators turned their attention to mediation again with Law n. 98 of August 9th, 
201462 and reintroduced a new mandatory form. On one hand, this law again made 
mandatory mediation a condition of admissibility for filing lawsuits; on the other, it 
transformed judge-ordered mediation by granting him/her the power to directly re-
quire the disputing parties to attempt mediation-based resolutions and suspend legal 
recourse, until they comply63.
Although other types of mediation were not affected by this decision and main-
tained their validity, over the months between the sentence of the Constitutional Court 
58. See. F. Delfini, “La mediazione per la conciliazione delle controversie civili e commerciali ed il ruolo dell’Avvocatura”, in 
Rivista di Diritto Privato, 15/1, 2010, pp. 131-141; L. Dittrich, “Il procedimento di mediazione nel d. lgs. N. 28 del 4 marzo 
2010”, in Rivista di diritto processuale, 3, 2010, pp. 575-594; Monteleone, “La mediazione ‘forzata’”, in Il giusto processo 
civile, 2010, pp. 24; G. Scarselli, “La nuova mediazione e conciliazione: le cose che non vanno”, in Il foro italiano, 5, 2010, 
5, pp. 146-151.
59. Ministero della Giustizia, Relazione sulla performance 2011, available from http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/conten-
tview.wp?previsiousPage=mg_14_7&contentId=ART779048. See observations by G. floridia, “La giustizia come servizio 
pubblico essenziale”, in Rivista Critica Diritto Privato, 15, 2010, pp. 136-140. 
60. M. Taruffo, “Considerazioni sparse su mediazione e diritti”, in Ars interpretandi, 9, 2004, pp. 97-112 (p. 108).
61. In Constitutional Court’s opinion, neither art. 5, 3d comma, let. A of the law or the 2008/52 European directive provide 
evidence in favor of mandatory mediation, available from http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionPronuncia.do (viewed 
on June 27th, 2016). 
See C. Besso, “La Corte Costituzionale e la mediazione”, in Giurisprudenza italiana, 2013, pp. 605-609; I. Pagni, “Gli spazi 
e il ruolo della mediazione dopo la sentenza della Corte costituzionale 6 dicembre 2012, n. 272”, in Corr. Giur., 2013, pp. 
262-268.
62. D. lgs. 28/2010, art. 5, 2°comma. 
63. Ibid.
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and the passing of the law, a drastic decline in mediation was observed and many me-
diation centers shut down.
The most important amendments have to do with compulsory mediation in the 
form of a mandatory informational meeting with the disputing parties and their attor-
neys in which the mediator outlines “the purpose and the process of mediation” and 
asks the parties if they are willing to undertake it. In addition to restoring the manda-
tory step of attempting mediation, albeit in a softer form, the law introduces some new 
elements: the requirement of legal assistance to the parties (attorneys must be present 
at all mediation meetings); a four-year term making comma 1-bis of art. 5 provisional 
until re-evaluation of its efficacy; finally, the Ministry of Justice’s monitoring of out-
comes64.
The forcible presence of attorneys in the mediation process in some way underscores 
the legislators’ weakness. First, it resulted from them giving in to the pressure exerted by 
lawyers’ associations who oppose the liberalization of the professional mediation mar-
ket. Second, it expresses the implicit belief that the disputing partners cannot be trusted 
to handle conflict management entirely on their own and their negotiating power ought 
to be ‘safeguarded’ by attorneys.
Incongruences in the Italian model of Justice 
Mediation in Italy seems to be headed towards increased formalization, which moves 
away from granting disputing parties autonomy in managing conflict, ignores the cru-
cial issue of the mediator’s professional competence, and relegates it to a subordinate 
position compared to the traditional trial and its inefficiencies. 
In Italy, lawmakers have seen mediation as a means of lifting some of the burden 
from the civil justice system, but have failed to recognize its underlying principles and 
significance. An analysis of the newly introduced sphere of mediation has indeed high-
lighted the points of incongruence between the punitive, formal and bureaucratized 
characteristics of the traditional judicial process and a conflict-management model 
based on the autonomy of all parties, voluntariness and confidentiality65.
64. F. Ferraris, “La novellata mediazione nelle controversie civili e commerciali: luci e ombre di un procedimento ‘revitaliz-
zato’”, in I contratti, 10, 2013, pp. 951-964 (p. 956).
65. G. Armone, P. Porreca, “La mediazione tra processo e conflitto”, in Il foro Italiano, (CXXXV), II, 2010, pp. 95-100; also 
see E. fabiani, M. leo, “Prime riflessioni sulla ‘mediazione finalizzata alla conciliazione delle controversie civili e commer-
ciali’ di cui al d.lgs 28/2010” in Judicium, www.judicium.it; G. Scarselli, “La nuova mediazione e conciliazione: le cose che 
non vanno”, in Il foro italiano, V, 2010, pp. 146-151; G. canale, “Luci ed ombre ad una prima lettura dello schema di decreto 
legislativo di attuazione della delega in materia di mediazione” in F. Auletta F., G. Califano, G. Della Pietra, N. Rascio (eds.), 
Sull’arbitrato. Studi offerti a Giovanni Verde, Jovene, Napoli, 2010, pp. 109-121; T. V. Russo, “Alcuni aspetti controversi nella 
disciplina della mediazione per la conciliazione delle controversie civili” in Mediares, 2010, 15/16, pp. 281-291.
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As noted by Taruffo, “the choice between ADR and the traditional judicial process 
involves deeper and more complex cultural implications that go well beyond the mere 
practical concern with selecting the swiftest and least expensive way of resolving a 
dispute”66.
Mediation was hastily introduced into the traditional judicial system without ap-
propriate consideration of its founding principles and/or of the social and political im-
plications of its integration; as such, the reform has proved to be ineffective and has 
failed to fulfill social expectations. Placing mediation within a system based upon the 
predominance of judgment and authoritative decision-making almost inevitably led to 
the legal community’s attempt to assimilate mediation into the traditional process by 
harnessing it and herding it into the familiar territory of formal process and profession-
al representation.
It is, however, important to distinguish between “centrality of jurisdiction” and “pri-
ority of jurisdiction”: the former makes reference to a constitutionally necessary ac-
tivity of judicial protection of rights, as indicated by articles 24 and 111 of the Italian 
Constitution, while the latter has to do with a “psychological” attitude that sees formal 
jurisdiction as the primary, if not sole, remedy for disputes67.
Luiso argues that giving traditional judicial methods priority is the consequence 
of an “old legacy” which seems to be at odds with the new legal reality based upon the 
principle of subsidiarity, wherein the formal process is seen as a last resort in dispute 
management to be used only when other avenues of conflict resolution have been ex-
hausted68. 
Canada’s proposed participative justice model is the result of an effective interaction 
between governmental institutions and the professional/scientific community, which 
have cooperated in developing a new policy of justice. In Italy, we have seen a politi-
cal failure caused by reluctance to opening up to new models and principles of justice 
designed to satisfy the needs of its citizens rather than the status quo of its institutions. 
This is why this attempt to respond to a crisis situation through the application of a new 
tool in the judicial system has proven to be weak and ineffective and has failed to light-
en the burden on the Courts; without an adequate reflection on the inadequacy of the 
traditional judicial model and a now unavoidable paradigm shift, effective integration 
will continue to be elusive.
66. M. Taruffo, Sui confini, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2002, p. 31.
67. See F. P. Luiso, “La conciliazione nel quadro della tutela dei diritti”, pp. 1206 ss.
68. Ibid.
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